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In this installment of The Briefing, Scott Hervey & Jessica Corpuz cover the landmark defamation case Copeland v. Netflix—dissecting the high bar for public figures to prove defamation and the critical concept of “actual malice.” From the Surviving R. Kelly documentary to First Amendment protections, they unpack the legal complexities surrounding public figures and media reporting.
Watch this episode on the Weintraub YouTube channel here.
Show Notes:
Scott: Surviving R. Kelly was a Netflix documentary series that delved into the extensive allegations of sexual abuse, misconduct, and predatory behavior leveled against the R&B singer R. Kelly. Diana Copeland, Kelly’s former personal assistant, claims she was falsely portrayed in the documentary as being essentially a co-conspirator in Kelly’s alleged sex crimes. Copeland sued Netflix and the producers of the documentary, Lifetime and A&E for defamation. There was a recent decision in Copeland versus Netflix, one that emphasized the stringent First Amendment protections for media when reporting on a public figure. How high is the bar for a public figure to prove defamation against the media outlet? And what does the legal concept of actual malice truly entail in such case? I’m Scott Herbie, a partner with the law firm of Weintraub Tobin, and I’m joined today by my partner, Jessica Corpus. Stay tuned as we dissect this significant decision and its implications for producers of programming of this type on this installment of the briefing. Jessica, welcome back. It’s good to have you.
Jessica: Thanks so much for having me, Scott.
Scott: This one, I think, is going to be quite interesting. I always like defamation cases because there’s always a lot to unpack.
Jessica: Oh, they’re very exciting cases. We get this question a lot, and having to educate people about the standard of defamation happens all the time in our world, so it’s good to talk about it.
Scott: Yeah, and more and more, you’re seeing defamation claims come out of not just documentaries, but scripted, essentially, fictional docudramas. But today, we’re looking at the R. Kelly documentary. And this is the recent decision in Diana Copeland versus Netflix. And it comes out of the United States district Court for the district of Delaware. That’s a district we don’t hear from very often, but we’re hearing from them today.
Jessica: So this decision comes as a result of Netflix’s motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss in federal court is called a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and it’s where a defendant moves to dismiss the complaint because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In other words, the defendant is arguing that even if everything that the plaintiff claims is true, those claims still don’t provide a legal basis for the court to grant them any relief.
Scott: Well said. So this case centers on a lawsuit brought by Diana Copeland, who was the personal assistant for the singer R. Kelly. Following R. Kelly’s arrest and charges relating to sexual abuse, Lifetime Entertainment produced a documentary series called Surviving R. Kelly. Copeland did not participate in the documentary. However, she alleges that an episode contained several false and defamatory statements about her, portraying her as a co-conspirator in Kelly’s crimes. She subsequently sued Netflix, which distributed the series, along with its producers Lifetime and A&E, for defamation.
Jessica: Those defendants moved to dismiss Copeland’s claims. Netflix based its motion on the following arguments. First, that the fair report privilege protects the statements. Second, that the statements are non-actionable opinions based on disclosed facts. And three, that Copeland is a public figure and that she failed to plea that defendants published the statements with actual malice.
Scott: That’s right. Now, the court said it didn’t need to address the first two arguments advanced by Netflix because Copeland failed to meet the actual malice standard.
Jessica: So just a little bit of history here behind the actual malice standard might be good.
Scott: Yeah. No, I agree. Why don’t you go for it?
Jessica: So the actual malice standard in defamation law originates from the landmark Supreme Court case of New York Times versus Sullivan. That case established that the First Amendment protects even defamatory speech against public figures, as long as the speech was not made with, quote, actual malice. To establish actual malice, a plaintiff must show that a defendant either knew that the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for whether or not they were true. This standard provides a significant shield for publishers when reporting on public figures involved in matters of public controversy.
Scott: Right. And in cases like this, cases where the claim is based on the portrayal of an individual in a documentary or a docudrama, we have seen the court focus on whether the producers deliberately portrayed the plaintiff in the hopes of insinuating a defamatory import to the viewer or whether the producers knew or acted in reckless disregard as to whether the portrayal would be interpreted by the average viewer as a defamatory statement of fact.
Jessica: Now, this requirement of establishing actual malice only applies to defamatory statements against public figures. Here, Copeland was Kelly’s personal assistant, hardly a position that one generally considers to be a public figure. So let’s talk a little bit about how and why the court found Copeland to be a public figure in this case.
Scott: Sure. So for the purposes of establishing actual malice, there are essentially two types of public figures. The first one is the general purpose public figure, an actor, a movie star, a well-known politician, someone that has achieved widespread fame or notoriety, meaning that their name and actions are matters of legitimate public interest wherever they go and whatever they do. The other is a limited purpose public figure, and that’s someone who voluntarily thrust themselves into the vortex of an existing public controversy or engages the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.
Jessica: In order to determine whether someone is a limited purpose public figure, courts usually ask whether the alleged defamation involves a public controversy, and if so, how involved the plaintiff is in that controversy.
Scott: Right. So here the court determined that Copeland was a limited purpose public figure. To reach that conclusion, the court applied that to test whether the alleged defamation involves a public controversy, and if so, how involved was the plaintiff in that controversy? So the court found that the allegations against Art Kelly involved sex crimes and child abuse, and those were undoubtedly a public controversy.
Jessica: Yeah, that seems very clear in this case, given the serious nature of those charges and the extensive public attention.
Scott: Right. And then the court examined Copeland’s involvement. Despite initially declining to participate in the surviving R. Kelly documentary, she later gave a brief interview on Good Morning, America about her experiences with R. Kelly. In this interview, she discussed making travel arrangements for R. Kelly’s girlfriend and her observations about their behavior. The court reasoned that by voluntarily going on national television to discuss R. Kelly, Copeland voluntarily injected herself into the public discourse surrounding this controversy and invited public attention, comment, and criticism.
Jessica: So in other words, her own decision to speak publicly on the matter played a key role in the court’s determination that she was a public figure for the limited purpose of this controversy.
Scott: Precisely right. Once the court classified Copeland as a limited purpose public figure, the legal standard required her to plausibly plea that the defendants acted with actual malice. This means she had to demonstrate that Netflix either knew the statements in the documentary were false or acted with reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false.
Jessica: So the court here provides some good guidance on how to make allegations of actual malice. The court says that actual malice focuses on the publisher’s mental state. While a plaintiff can sufficiently plea actual malice through using circumstantial evidence, it must be enough for the court to draw the reasonable inference that each of the defendants knew the actionable statements were false or that they had acted with reckless disregard as to whether or not they were true.
Scott: That’s right. And the court found that Copeland failed to plausibly plea actual malice. While Copeland alleged that the defendants were reckless, deliberate, and malicious, and that they had access to the truth, yet chose to ignore it, the court considered these allegations to be conclusory and unsupported by sufficient factual detail.
Jessica: Copeland did include some specific factual allegations in her complaint. She argued that producing had a bad motive or vendetta against her because she chose to do Good Morning America instead of their documentary. She also alleged that the producers asked two former Kelly employees, who allegedly had personal vendettas against Copeland, to appear on the documentary and that the producers encouraged other former Kelly employees to say negative things about Copeland.
Scott: Right. And as to this, the court said that at most this just suggests a bad motive or ill will, but that’s not equivalent to actual malice. The focus of actual malice is the publisher’s state of mind regarding the truth of the statements, not their feelings toward the plaintiff, whether ill or positive.
Jessica: Yeah, this is a really important distinction. Even if the defendants harbored negative feelings towards Copeland, that wouldn’t satisfy the actual malice standard if they believe the statements that they published were true.
Scott: Right, right. The court further noted that Copeland provided no basis to infer that the defendants seriously doubted the veracity of their sources or the accuracy of the information presented in the documentary. She didn’t allege that the defendants knew their sources were unreliable or had any specific reason to distrust them.
Jessica: You know, it seems like the court is emphasizing significant protection the First Amendment affords to publishers when reporting on public figures involved in public controversies, and therefore requiring a really high bar to prove defamation.
Scott: Absolutely. So here the Court explicitly stated that the First Amendment shield publishers from lawsuits when they report inaccurately about public figures involved in public controversies, as long as they do so without actual malice. Now, some claim and argue that this protection aims to ensure a robust and open discussion of matters of public concern. Others believe that New York Times versus Sullivan is a bad case, and the requirement of establishing actual malice basically leads to poor reporting and a lack of follow-through on the part of reporters.
Jessica: Yeah, I absolutely agree. Here in this case, because Copeland did not plausibly please to actual malice, the court dismissed her defamation claim and her other related tort claims that relied on the same allegations, such as false light, invasion of privacy, and intentional and negligent inflection of emotional distress. The court also dismissed her claim for appropriation of her name and likeness. However, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice, meaning that Copeland has the option to refile her complaint if she can present more substantial factual allegations to support her claims.
Scott: Right. That’s a key point for Copeland. While this round didn’t go her the court has left open the possibility of a renewed legal effort with more concrete evidence.
Jessica: Absolutely. So what are the crucial takeaways from Copeland v. Netflix for our listeners?
Scott: Well, this case really highlights the heavy lift for public figures to win a defamation lawsuit against media entities. The actual malice standards has a very high legal threshold. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the publisher had actual knowledge of the falsity or had a reckless disregard for the truth. Simple negligence or even ill will just won’t work.
Jessica: And the determination of public figure status is very fact-dependent. Voluntarily engaging in public discourse on a matter of public controversy can lead to being classified as a limited purpose public figure, even if that public engagement is limited.
Scott: Right. And finally, this case underscores the necessity for plaintiffs and defamation cases involving public figures to plea specific factual allegations of actual malice, rather than just stating legal conclusions. A plaintiff needs to provide details that suggests that the publisher had serious doubts about the truth of what they were publishing. This case serves as a reminder of the robust protections for free speech, or at least the high pleading requirements required, particularly when it comes to reporting on individuals involved in matters of public interest.
Jessica: It’s going to be really interesting to see if Copeland will file an admitted complaint here.
Scott: Yeah, it will be. We’ll keep an eye on this case and certainly report back. Jessica, thanks for joining me today.
Jessica: Thanks for having me.
Scott: Well, that’s all for today’s episode of The Briefing. Thanks to Jessica for joining me today. And thank you, the listener or viewer, for tuning in. We hope you found this episode informative and enjoyable. If you did, please remember to subscribe, leave us a review, and share this episode with your friends and colleagues. And if you have any questions about the topics we cover today, please leave us a comment.